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**What Induces Firms to
License Foreign
Technologies?
International Survey
Evidence**



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Dirk Dohse, Rajeev K. Goel, and Michael A. Nelson

ABSTRACT

WHAT INDUCES FIRMS TO LICENSE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGIES? INTERNATIONAL SURVEY EVIDENCE

Dirk Dohse, Rajeev K. Goel, and Michael A. Nelson

The paper provides firm-level insights into the drivers of foreign technology licensing from the perspective of the licensee, using data across 114 nations. Drawing on the theoretical foundations related to knowledge spillovers, results show that manufacturing firms with own R&D capabilities were more likely to license foreign technologies, as were larger firms and those situated in the nations' main business city. Greater literacy facilitated foreign technology licensing, while overall economic prosperity of a nation did not have a significant impact. Interestingly, higher domestic interest rates, related to capital costs and to overall monetary policy, induced firms to license technology from abroad. Finally, some institutions like greater economic freedom aided technology licensing, while others like strong patent protection were not found to have a sizable impact.

Keywords: technology licensing; R&D; firm size; location; taxes; informal competition

JEL classification: L24; O33; O57

Dirk Dohse

Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Kiellinie 66
D-24105 Kiel, Germany
Email: dirk.dohse@ifw-kiel.de
www.ifw-kiel.de

Rajeev K. Goel

Kiel Institute for the World Economy
and
Illinois State University
Normal, IL 61790-4200, USA.
Email: rkguel@ilstu.edu

Michael A. Nelson

University of Akron
302 E Buchtel Ave,
Akron, OH 44325, USA
Email: nelson2@uakron.edu

1. INTRODUCTION

The increasing popularity of technology licensing worldwide has many factors driving it. Licensing foreign technologies is a common means for firms to stay competitive by getting closer to the technology frontier. It also provides an easy foot-in-the-door for foreign firms to enter new markets. Foreign firms might have technological advantages due to better institutional support for innovation abroad, historical inertia from some technologies being developed earlier overseas (see Goel and Saunoris (2016)), or a different market competitiveness promoting innovation overseas. Furthermore, governments, especially those in developing nations, often provide inducements in the form of subsidies to foster foreign technology licensing with the goal of enhancing productivity and economic growth (Brown et al. (1991)). The technology licensing agreements might take various forms with research joint ventures (RJVs) at one end of the spectrum providing complete sharing of research knowledge. However, not all knowledge flows via formal channels. Some technical knowledge leaks via casual exchanges, movement of labor or reverse engineering; yet, planned, detailed and systematic knowledge flows are only possible through formal technology licensing agreements.

The literature has paid attention to the impact of technology licensing on the development of poor and emerging countries and on incentives and relative costs-benefits of technology licensing (see Basant and Fikkert (1996), López (2008); Saggi (2002) and Section 2.1 of this paper for a survey). There is, however, a shortage of academic research that systematically analyzes the drivers of foreign technology licensing from the perspective of the licensees.

The present work aims to address this gap in the literature by examining firm-level data across numerous countries. Specifically, we examine the drivers of foreign technology licensing by (primarily) manufacturing firms. Whereas governments can change the incentives for licensing either directly via subsidies or indirectly via strengthening institutions like patent protection, it is ultimately the decision of individual firms to license technologies versus trying to invent in-house. Thus, the firm-level considerations in this study are pertinent and potentially instructive.

Key questions addressed in this work are:

- *Does own R&D facilitate or crowd-out foreign technology licensing?* - On the one hand, own R&D capabilities enhance absorptive capacity to understand and enhance licensed technologies for better internal use by the licensee; on the other hand, own R&D might make the firm reluctant to pay royalties and lock themselves into existing technologies (in the hope that they might invent something better).
- *How important a role does institutional quality play in firm decision making to license foreign technology?* We consider a variety of measures of the external environment in which the firm operates including patent protection laws, literacy, economic freedom, threat from the underground economy, and cost of borrowing.
- *Does location in the nation's main business city facilitate technology licensing?* Location is tied to informal knowledge flows and transactions costs that would affect the propensity to license new technologies.

- *How important are firms' characteristics such as age, size, and ownership structure in affecting the tendencies to license foreign technologies?* - Older, larger, sole proprietor firms might have characteristics that might make them particularly prone to license foreign technologies.

From a policy angle, nations are interested in technical self-sufficiency or in evaluating the benefits of their domestic research support (e.g., R&D tax credits, research subsidies, etc.) and, more broadly, in the effects of institutions as drivers of domestic firms towards foreign technology licensing. There is, however, a shortage of systematic research on the drivers of foreign technology licensing at the firm level. Results of this study using firm-level data on thousands of firms from over a hundred nations are supportive of the hypotheses that own R&D, location in the nation's main business city and good institutions drive foreign technology licensing.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and Section 3 outlines the theoretical model which sets up three testable hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data employed and the estimation strategy. The results are reported in Section 5, while the final section provides some concluding remarks.

2. TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LITERATURE

Given the breadth of the extant literature on licensing, it is useful first to define the parameters that are relevant for this study. Broadly speaking, there are four dimensions to technology licensing. On the one hand, there are studies considering causes or effects of licensing, and the present work examines the causes of licensing. On the other hand, there is the distinction in terms of the focus on the behavior of the licensor or that of the licensee, and this study focuses on the latter.

2.1 TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Technological innovation is a key driver of industrialization and catch up in developing countries. Traditionally, knowledge production and genuine innovation are concentrated in a few highly developed countries, namely, United States, Japan and the Western Europe (the so-called 'triadic countries'), which account for the lion's share of worldwide patents, but account for less than 12% of world population. While these countries innovate and create their own knowledge, "... developing countries acquire technology by copying or importing them from the industrialized world." (Lopez (2008, p. 560)).

Knowledge transfer from developed to developing countries is, however, neither instantaneous nor costless. Some knowledge spills over via trade (e.g. by means of reverse engineering), FDI or movement of skilled labor (see, for example, Bastié et al. (2018)). A more direct way for LDC firms to acquire new technology is through licensing agreements with foreign firms in developed countries. In fact, licensing is increasingly relevant as a source of new technology. Charges for the use of intellectual property increased from less than \$3 billion in 1970 to more than \$300 billion in 2016 (World Bank (2018)), and it is widely held that imported technologies provide "the most important initial input into technological learning in developing countries" (Lall, (2000, p. 20)). There is, however, an ongoing discussion concerning the relative importance of foreign

technology acquisition (as compared to developing countries' own innovation efforts) and concerning the interplay between indigenous innovation and the acquisition of foreign technology.

Acquiring foreign technology created in developed countries may be seen as an attractive and efficient strategy for developing countries, as own innovation efforts are costly, risky and path dependent (Fu et al. (2011), Goel and Saunoris (2016)). Hence, if innovations developed abroad were easy to adopt and fitting the developing country context, technologically backward countries could, in principle, catch up rapidly by absorbing the most advanced technologies (Eaton and Kortum (1997); Grossman and Helpman (1994)).

However, the acquisition of foreign technologies is neither costless nor unconditional (Fu et al. (2011)). Technological change is a localized learning by doing process (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969)), and new technologies are often tailored to the technological, social and institutional context of the country in which they are created (Basu and Weil (1998)). Moreover, factor endowments in developed and developing countries differ substantially. As innovators have an incentive to maximize the returns on their innovation, technical change is biased to make optimal use of the conditions prevailing in the country where the technology is created. Hence, new technologies created in the North may be inappropriate for the conditions in the South, and thus less productive (Acemoglu (2002), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999)).

A successful diffusion and adoption of new technologies thus depends on substantial and well directed technological efforts by the receiving countries (Lall (2001, 2005)) and on the absorptive capacity of the local firms and organizations in the receiving countries (Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Girma (2005)). Own R&D activities carried out by local firms and organizations play a dual role in creating new knowledge and increasing absorptive capacity (Aghion and Hewitt (1998), Griffith et al. (2004)), suggesting that indigenous innovation efforts and foreign technology licensing might be complementary.

The question whether technology purchases and indigenous innovation are complements or rather substitutes is of high political relevance and a matter of substantial controversy. Whereas some countries like South Korea allow technology licensing, expecting positive spillovers, other countries like India or some Latin American countries have restricted technology licensing as "... they fear that it could make them technologically dependent on the industrialized countries and even slow down technological progress." (Lopez (2008, p. 561)).

Empirical evidence in this regard is mixed. Early studies by Basant (1993) and others find evidence that indigenous R&D and technology purchases from developed countries are substitutes, suggesting that restrictions on technology purchases might be an effective means of stimulating domestic R&D. The influential study by Basant and Fikkert (1996) confirms that technology purchases and R&D expenditures are substitutes for Indian firms, while at the same time showing that private returns to technology purchases are higher than private returns to own R&D, and that there are substantial domestic and international knowledge spillovers (Basant and Fikkert (1996, p. 187)). They conclude that restricting / taxing technology purchases might thus impose substantial cost on the Indian economy. More recent research tends to find that foreign technology purchases and domestic R&D are complements rather than substitutes (Fu (2008), Fu et al. (2011), Girma (2005), Li (2011)), and that foreign technology licensing generates substantial productivity spillovers in the receiving economy (Lopez (2008)).

One related area of interest has been the comparison of technology licensing versus foreign direct investment (Contractor (1984), Kim and Park (2017), Saggi (1996)). However, as one would notice, not all FDI necessarily brings in new technology. For instance, there could be foreign investments in the construction sector, without any accompanying new technologies.

The literature on the effects of licensing dwells on issues like welfare impacts (Saggi (1996)) and stock market returns (Walter (2012)). A crucial aspect that is hard to capture empirically, in the literature and in the present study, deals with the nature and complexity of individual licensing contracts. This shortcoming, however, is not limited to licensing contracts and plagues all kinds of studies that have contractual relations as one of their bases.

2.2 MICROECONOMIC (FIRM-LEVEL) PERSPECTIVE

Another strand of the literature deals with the microeconomic (firm level) perspective on technology licensing. While there is a substantial number of papers dealing with the licensor's perspective, there is a scarcity of systematic research taking the licensee's perspective. The present research tries to contribute in this regard. Attention to licensor's incentives is also important from policymakers' perspective, especially those in developing nations trying to weigh technical self-reliance by developing technologies in-house against technological leapfrogging via licensing foreign technologies.

2.3 THE LICENSOR'S PERSPECTIVE

A firm that possesses a proprietary technology will seek to exploit that advantage in foreign markets (Contractor (1984)). Licensing is an attractive means of monetizing such advantage, in particular for firms that lack adequate downstream commercialization (production and marketing) capabilities (Fosfuri (2006)). Licensing does, however, entail a tradeoff: The positive effects from licensing revenues must be weighed against the negative effects (reduced market share and/or lower price cost margins) from increased competition from the licensees (Fosfuri (2006)).

Whereas earlier studies have focused on the revenue motive, more recent research has shown that there is a variety of further drivers of technology licensing that have to be taken into account as well. For example, Kim and Vonortas (2006) examined licensor behavior based on a large panel data set of US traded companies across all industry sectors during the period 1990-1999. They find technological knowledge of the licensor, its prior exposure to technology licensing, the rate of growth of its primary industry, the strength of intellectual property protection in the industry, and the nature of the technologies of the licensor (general purpose technologies) to be important determinants of the propensity to sell technology through licenses. Fosfuri (2006) analyzes technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986-1996, finding that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology-specific product differentiation.

Lichtenthaler (2007) provides an overview of the factors that motivate firms to license out technology. These factors include generating revenues, fulfilling legal conditions (compulsory licensing), realizing foreign market entry, selling additional products, setting standards, ensuring

technology leadership, learning, getting access to foreign knowledge enhancing reputation, strengthening networks and gaining freedom to operate¹ (Lichtenthaler (2007, p. 73). While licensing in all industries is driven by a variety of factors, the relative importance of strategic motives (as compared to the revenue motive) is increasing (also see Motohashi (2008) for related evidence from Japan).

2.4 THE LICENSEE'S PERSPECTIVE

The role of technology for firm success

Technological knowledge is a major source of competitive advantage, as it enables firms to improve their products, increase differentiation from competitors and to reduce costs (Porter (1985)). Licensing is thus a way for licensees to gain access to valuable technology and to improve their competitiveness in a dynamic market environment. However, acquiring foreign technology is not only costly, but also a risky endeavor, as evidenced by the high failure rates of technology alliances (Park and Ungson (2001)). Unfortunately, there are very few large scale firm-level studies analyzing the determinants of foreign technology licensing from the licensee's perspective.

The interrelation between foreign technology purchase and own R&D

The interrelation between foreign technology purchase and indigenous research that is a big topic at the macroeconomic level is of critical importance at the microeconomic (firm) level as well. From the point of view of a single firm, foreign technology licensing might substitute for (often extremely costly) own R&D efforts. On the other hand, for inward technology transfer to be successful, firms need to develop absorptive capacity, i.e. the ability to recognize, assimilate and apply external knowledge in the context of innovation and learning processes (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)). Clearly, own R&D is a means of increasing absorptive capacity. Hence, own R&D and foreign technology licensing might most appropriately be viewed as substitutes as well as complements. While there exists manifold case study evidence, we are not aware of any large scale, cross-country studies that systematically analyze the interrelation between firms own R&D and foreign technology purchase.

The macroeconomic and institutional environment

In addition to firm-level incentives to license technologies, the macroeconomic and institutional environment plays a key role. Monetary policy is an important, yet widely overlooked determinant of the relative attractiveness of technology licensing. A restrictive monetary policy that drives up interest rates makes investments in own R&D more expensive, and foreign technology purchases relatively more attractive from the perspective of the licensees. Institutional variables might play an important role as well: Institutional quality is multi-dimensional and can be variously measured via the level of education, patent protection (Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006)), economic freedom, with corruption and informal markets signifying weak institutions (see Knack and Keefer (1995) for a general overview and Yang and Maskus (2001) for theoretical model in the context of licensing). While the literature of informal or shadow markets has studied numerous causes and effects (see Schneider and Enste (2000), Goel

¹ The aim of guaranteeing freedom to operate refers to certain cross-licensing agreements. "Here, the main driver of technology licensing is avoiding potential patent infringement lawsuits, which would prevent a firm from further developing its technologies and commercializing its products." (Lichtenthaler (2007, p. 71)).

et al. (2015) for an example), the connection with technology-licensing does not seem to have been examined, especially at the firm level. Informal firms might increase market competitiveness, increasing incentives for technology licensing. On the other hand, unauthorized spillovers to underground firms might provide perverse incentives for licensing.

The role of location

Knowledge is not evenly distributed across geographic space. There are places with an abundance of knowledge resources and thick knowledge flows that foster the creation and growth of knowledge-based firms (see Audretsch and Dohse (2007) and Dohse and Vaona (2014) for empirical evidence). Strategic location, i.e. locational decisions that maximize firms' access to relevant knowledge resources receive increasing academic attention (Alcacer and Chung (2007), Christensen and Drejer (2005), Colombo and Dawid (2014)). While the spillovers literature has recognized the importance of location in that there are greater spillovers to firms that are geographically closer (or to sources of knowledge such as universities or science parks), (see Jaffe et al. (1993); Goel (1994)) relatively little is known, however, about the location of firms that purchase foreign technologies by way of licensing. A country's main business regions seem to be particularly suitable locations for such firms for two reasons: First, main business cities are often the economic centers of their respective countries or at least agglomerations with a high density of economic activity. Second, these regions often form their countries interface to the outside world. Hence, they combine what has been denoted "local buzz" and "global pipelines" in the pertinent literature (Bathelt et al. (2004), Owen-Smith and Powell (2004), Storper and Venables (2004)). "Local buzz" denotes a vibrant interaction and knowledge exchange within a city or region (Storper and Venables (2004)), whereas the term "pipeline" is used to refer to the channels used in distant knowledge and technology transfer interactions (Owen-Smith and Powell (2004)). The combination of high levels of buzz and many global pipelines provides firms located in these regions with a string of advantages not available to outsiders (Bathelt et al. (2004)). On the one hand, they have superior access to international knowledge, and on the other hand they benefit from vibrant interfirm knowledge exchange within the region that is likely to increase their absorptive capacity necessary to grasp the full benefits provided by the foreign technology. One might thus expect that firms' propensity to purchase foreign technologies by way of licensing is not independent of their location.

To summarize, in the landscape of the literature, there are very few firm-level studies based on cross-country surveys, and even fewer focusing on licensees in developing nations. These are aspects that the present work brings to the table.

3. MODEL

The theoretical foundation of this work can be grounded in the literature of research spillovers (see Griliches (1992)). As mentioned above, spillovers from rivals' research knowledge might be passive (via networking, conferences, reverse engineering) or active (via formal licensing). Let $0 \leq \beta \leq 1$ denote the spillover rate, where $\beta = 0$ denotes complete lack of spillovers, and $\beta = 1$ denotes full knowledge sharing, as in a research joint venture. Let x_i denote firm i 's research spending

(see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) for a seminal work, and Goel and Haruna (2011) for an application).

Research spillovers could reduce production costs and/or lead to new or improved products. For the sake of argument and tractability let us assume that there are cost-reducing innovations, and that there is only one rival foreign firm, with R&D X (which is potentially related to the technology the domestic firm is seeking to license).

While gains from informal knowledge transfers can be somewhat reaped by firms who do not have their own R&D capabilities, reaping gains from technology licensing is more likely if the recipient firm disposes of absorptive capacity, which is enhanced by own R&D. Thus, spillovers β can be deemed a function of the recipient firm's R&D, such that $\beta_i(x_i)$, and that $\beta' > 0$; and $\beta'' < 0$, implying diminishing returns to R&D efforts.² In this manner the spillovers are firm-specific (i.e., depending of individual research capabilities), such that two firms licensing same or similar technologies might reap different benefits), and our firm level data somewhat enables us to capture this.³ For instance, there are likely to be differences between large and small firms (scale economies, technology absorption capabilities), firm age (learning), and ownership structure (whether the firm is a sole proprietorship), institutional environment and location.

This sets up our first hypothesis:

H1: Firms with own R&D capabilities are more likely to license foreign technologies, *ceteris paribus*.

In the empirical section below, a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the R&D variable would signify that H1 satisfied, and, in terms of the theoretical framework above, would imply $\beta(x_i) > 0$.

The ability to absorb spillovers is also dictated by the external environment, including the level of prosperity, institutions (e.g., patent protection), literacy (absorption capacity), economic freedom (transactions costs), presence of informal competitors (unauthorized spillovers) and tax policies (see Knack and Keefer (1995) for seminal empirical work on the role of different institutions). The costs of technology and capital costs are approximated by including the real interest rate. The interest rate variable can be seen as addressing the nation's macroeconomic monetary policy and how that impacts the licensing of foreign technology. Higher interest rates would dissuade domestic investments (in R&D or otherwise) and make foreign technologies relatively more attractive.⁴ Given the importance of the institutional setup, we arrive at our second hypothesis:

H2: Better institutional quality would facilitate foreign technology licensing, *ceteris paribus*.

² Taking a leaf out of the seminal work of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) on cost-reducing innovations, one specific functional form consistent with our assumptions is $\beta_i(x_i) = \beta x_i^\alpha$, with $\beta > 0$; and $0 < \alpha < 1$.

³ Even stylized theoretical models of research spillovers in various contexts have found it challenging to deal with the complexities posed by firm-specific spillovers.

⁴ Of course, international technology collaborations come in various forms, involving no equity participation and equity participation by foreign partners. So, the overall effect of interest rates would depend upon the specific nature of individual collaborations (see, for example, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013); also Goel (1999)). Our firm-level data, unfortunately, lacks that level of detail about specific contracts.

Further, the role of geographic location in fostering positive spillovers of knowledge and networking opportunities via greater interactions and lower transactions costs has been noted in the literature (see Jaffe et al. (1993)). We consider the role of location in the context of the propensity to license foreign technology by including a variable for firms that are located in the main business city of the nations (Shanghai for China, Mumbai for India, etc.). In addition to the above channels, with regard to foreign collaborations, foreign firms are likely to liaison offices in main business cities that would facilitate technology licensing. Strategic location might also play a role in entry deterrence, as noted by Goel (1994) and others. This sets up our final hypothesis:

H3: Firms located in major business cities are, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to license foreign technologies.

We now turn to testing the hypotheses outlined above. In addressing this we also control in our empirical setup for firm-specific characteristics such as longevity, size, legal status that may be relevant in technology adoption decisions.

4. DATA AND ESTIMATION

4.1 DATA

The main survey data for this study comes from the Enterprise Surveys, organized within the Enterprise Analysis Unit of the World Bank (<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org>). For the past two decades, these surveys have asked business owners and top managers a multitude of business-rated questions to thousands of firms across numerous aspects of business operation.⁵ The surveys cover both the manufacturing and service sector, however questions on the licensing of foreign technology, of primary interest in the present study, are only asked in the manufacturing survey instrument. Only surveys complying with the Enterprise Surveys Global Methodology were included in the data set used in this analysis.⁶

Nations are surveyed in a year between 2006 and 2016, with a handful of countries sampled multiple times over this time period (see the Appendix for details). As the Appendix shows, the survey is dominated by developing nations, which is especially useful for two reasons: (i) firms in developing nations are more likely to demand foreign technologies due to low local technology availability and many developing nations being behind the technology frontier; and (ii) relatively less is known about the behavior of firms in developing nations and the use of this survey to study technology licensing will provide some useful insights.

The survey data are supplemented with other pertinent aggregate data from well-known international sources. Details about the variables, including definitions, summary statistics and

⁵ For a comparison of the Enterprise Survey with the related, but complementary, World Bank Doing Business Survey see <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/Enterprise-Surveys-versus-Doing-Business>.

⁶ <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology>.

data sources are in Table 1, and Table 2 provides pairwise correlations between key variables in the analysis.

4.2 ESTIMATION

Based on the above discussion, we take the incentives of a firm to license foreign technology to be driven by its own R&D capability, Location, other firm characteristics (including age, size and ownership structure), macroeconomic factors (economic prosperity, interest rates), and institutional quality (economic freedom, patent protection, informal markets, and tax administration). The general form of the estimated equation is the following:

$$\text{Licensing}_{ij} = f(\text{R\&D}_{ij}, \text{GDP}_j, \text{Interest rate}_j, \text{Literacy}(\text{EDU}_j), \text{other institutional characteristics}_{ij}, \text{Location}_{ij}, \text{other firm characteristics}_{ij}) \quad (1)$$

where

other institutional characteristics = economic freedom (EF); patent protection (PatentPROT); informal competition (INFORMAL); tax administration (TAX);

other firm characteristics = AGE; SIZE; sole proprietor (SOLEprop);

and indices denote firm-level variables (i) and country-level variables (j), respectively.

The dependent variable, Licensing, is a binary variable that is coded 1 if a firm in the sample was using technology licensed from a foreign-owned company (excluding office software).⁷ In our sample, nearly 14% of firms were using foreign-licensed technologies.

Consistent with the theoretical model, Hypothesis 1, and in line with the arguments that a firm's own research and development activity enhances its absorptive capacity (Hammerschmidt (2009)), a main determinant of interest included in the model is own R&D. We would expect, ceteris paribus, the impact of own R&D on the propensity to license foreign technology to be positive. In our sample, about one-fourth of the firms conducted their own R&D (in the years prior to the survey).

The institutional structure of nations dictate the workings of markets, and we consider several dimensions, including economic freedom, education, interest rates, taxation, and patent protection. About a third of the firms viewed taxes as an obstacle to business operations (Table 1). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we would expect better institutions to facilitate knowledge transfers. We also consider the presence of informal competitors as an indirect measure of a lack of institutional capacity. More competitors in the informal sector would imply greater unauthorized knowledge spillovers, making firms reluctant to invest/license technology. The presence of informal competition seemed widespread as 47% of sample firms recognized the threat of informal competitors.

⁷ Some other related aspects that could potentially be important in this context are the nature of the licensing contracts (see Kim and Vonortas (2006)) and whether the licensor or licensee initiated the collaboration. The underlying surveys were general and did not ask these related questions.

The impacts of R&D are likely to be compounded when the overall literacy is high. This would be due to a better quality of the R&D-supporting casts and overall better ability to absorb casual spillovers. Although economic prosperity and literacy are generally positively related, greater economic prosperity also has other influences in terms strengthening firms' confidence in long-term planning (and hence, investments in uncertain R&D). Furthermore, more prosperous nations usually have better institutions.

Interest rates capture the cost of borrowing and also the impact of a nation's monetary policy. Higher domestic interest rates would make foreign technology licensing relatively more attractive (by increasing the relative costs of the alternative - development of technologies internally).

Finally, a variable LOCATION denotes whether the firm is located in the nation's main business city. This would capture disproportionately greater information flows and lower transactions costs in major business centers and address Hypothesis 3. The importance of location in knowledge flows has been recognized by others, with Jaffe et al. (1993) being a well-cited work. Nearly 46% of sample firms were located in the main business city of their country.

Finally, the influence of firm characteristics could be positive or negative depending upon whether they facilitate or check propensities toward foreign technology licensing (see Fosfuri (2006), Kim and Vonortas (2006), Walter (2012)). For instance, sole proprietorships might view foreign technologies favorably when sole owners, given their exclusive appropriation of profits, view the benefits of foreign technology and are able to make efficient decision. Yet, sole ownership, could lead to inertia and a lack of differing views that might lead to foreign technologies being viewed less favorably. In contrast larger firms may be have greater resources to acquire foreign technologies and be in a better position to support their use once acquired. This is consistent with larger size enabling firms to better exploit research synergies across various divisions (see Motohashi (2008)). Larger firms may also have greater relative stability and a longer time horizon to better exploit foreign technologies. The average age of firms in the sample was about 22 years, with nearly a third being sole proprietors in our data set (Table 1). In terms of size, the average firm had 112 full-time employees, with a wide range from one to 30,000.

5. RESULTS

Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, all the models are estimated using the Logit estimation procedure, and the statistical significance of individual coefficients is based on standard errors clustered at the country level. The overall fit of the various models is quite decent as shown by the statistically significant χ^2 s.

5.1 BASELINE MODELS

The baseline results are reported in Table 3, across different variations of equation (1) above. With regard to the main variable of interest, R&D, there is strong support for Hypothesis 1 in all the models - firms that engaged in R&D were more likely to license foreign technologies. Own R&D capability better enables firms to absorb and exploit the rewards of foreign technologies (in

other words, $\beta(x_i) > 0$. This finding is in line with arguments developed by Hammerschmidt (2009), among others.

With regard to institutional quality (Hypothesis 2), there is little evidence that GDP or patent protection laws have an effect on licensing decisions in our data set.⁸ The evidence is also statistically weak that economic freedom – broadly defined – influences adoption of foreign technologies. In contrast, the findings indicate that higher real interest rates fostered foreign technology licensing. The effect of interest rates can also be seen as a rise in domestic capital/R&D costs which makes foreign technology relatively more attractive. The evidence is strongest for this in Models 3.1 and 3.2, but not strong in Model 3.3.

With regard to firm characteristics, the strongest evidence is with regard to firm size. Larger firms, *ceteris paribus*, were more likely to license foreign technology. Our findings support the argument that larger size enables firms to better exploit research synergies across various divisions, and with larger firms have greater relative stability and a longer time horizon to better exploit foreign technologies. It is also consistent with Kim and Vonortas (2006) who found that larger firms, especially those in industries with ‘complex’ technologies, were more likely to engage in cross-licensing. On the other hand, older firms and firms that were sole proprietorships were found to be no different from the overall sample with regard to propensities to license foreign technologies.

5.2 NONLINEAR EFFECTS: INTERACTION TERMS

To obtain additional insights into the results obtained in the baseline models, Models 4.1-4.3 in Table 4 consider alternate interaction terms of firm characteristics (age, size and sole proprietorship interacted with R&D).

Of the three interactions considered, only the one interacting firm size with R&D is significant (and negative - Model 4.1), while the interactions of R&D with age and sole proprietorship (Models 4.2 and 4.3) are statistically insignificant. The principal conclusion regarding interaction term in Model 4.1 is unchanged by adding the real interest rate variable in Model 4.4. These results imply that while larger and R&D-investing/capable firms are more likely to license foreign technologies, these tendencies are somewhat tempered for firms that are both - i.e., large and R&D-capable. A possible interpretation is that there maybe more internal synergies from R&D for large firms, mitigating the need to purchase technologies from external sources. Large firms also have greater stability, longevity, that lowers their discount rates and they do not "jump" at the sight of foreign technology availability. Another explanation, however, could draw on the X-inefficiency literature, whereby inertia or complacency with R&D-conducting large firms might slow their decision-making in terms of seeking foreign technology collaborators.⁹

Such tendencies do not seem to be present for older firms that conduct R&D or sole proprietorships that have their own R&D capabilities. In other words, older, R&D-performing

⁸ Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) note the possibility of differing effects of patent protection in technology licensing.

⁹ We acknowledge that these findings should be viewed with some caution as the R&D spending variable is dichotomous reflecting only if the firm engages in such activity and not the actual amount of spending.

firms and sole proprietorships with R&D do not distinguish themselves in terms of their licensing behavior. The results for the other controls mostly support what was found in Table 3, although there is now some evidence that older firms tend to rely less on foreign technology (Models 4.1 and 4.2).

5.3 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: EFFECTS OF EDUCATION, LOCATION, INFORMAL MARKETS, AND TAX ADMINISTRATION

To shed additional light into the drivers of foreign technology licensing, we consider a few more dimensions. These include adding the effects of literacy, location, informal markets and tax administration (perceptions of tax system as an obstacle). These aspects broadly deal with input quality (literacy), firm characteristics (location), and institutional quality (taxation and informal markets). The corresponding results are reported in Table 5.

Greater literacy (Model 5.1) has the expected positive sign and it is statistically significant. A more educated population/workforce better enables R&D-capable firms, and even empowers firms that do not themselves conduct R&D to reap gains from spillovers of others' knowledge.

Competition from the informal sector encourages foreign technology licensing (Model 5.2). This makes sense as increased competition from informal competitors provide additional inducements to license foreign technologies, which might enable firms to stay ahead of competition.¹⁰

The effects of locating in the nation's major business city are positive and reinforce the greater spillovers story discussed above (Model 5.3). This finding is robust for different model specifications (see also Models 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4). The greater licensing by these firms is facilitated via lower transactions costs of information exchanges (formal and informal), better networking (business conferences and exhibitions are more likely to be held in major business cities) and easier access to potential foreign collaborators. Hence, they combine what has been denoted "local buzz" and "global pipelines" in the pertinent literature (Bathelt et al. (2004)). This finding supports Hypothesis 3, and adds an additional dimension to the broader literature on localized knowledge spillovers.

Finally, perceptions of taxes as a barrier has the expected negative sign and the corresponding coefficient but is not statistically significant at conventional levels (Model 5.4).¹¹ Higher taxes leave less money for paying licensing royalties, while also reducing the potential gains from licensing.

Again, the results with regard to the other controls are similar to what was reported earlier, with the positive impact of R&D supporting our Hypothesis 1. In sum, the additional variables have the expected signs and their inclusion broadens the appeal and potential applicability of our findings.

5.4 MARGINAL EFFECTS


¹⁰ See Goel et al. (2015) for a macro-level study of innovation and informal entrepreneurship)

¹¹ Note that since taxes are component of the (lack of) economic freedom, economic freedom is excluded as a regressor in Model 5.4.

Further insights can be gained by exploring the marginal effects associated with the parameter estimates for the logistic models reported above. Here we focus on the key variables highlighted above in terms of their statistical significance.


Research and Development: Using the Model 3.1 estimates, the probability that firms will use foreign-owned technology increases from ten to 17 percent for firms that invest in R&D when the values for the other variables in the model are evaluated at sample means. This difference is consistent using the other two models reported in Table 3, Table 4 (where R&D is not also included as an interaction term), and in Table 5. The difference is also sizable when compared with the mean and standard deviation of the *Licensing* variable (Table 1).

Firm Size. The marginal plots for the firm size variable (number of full-time employees) are depicted in Figure 1 assuming sample mean values for the other variables in the model. The associated confidence interval (95% level) is displayed as the area shaded in red around these point estimates. This analysis strongly reinforces the conclusion drawn above that firm size is an important factor in the use of foreign technology in manufacturing operations. The probability of using such technology increases from under 10 percent (firm size less than 10 employees) to over 35 percent for establishments employing more than 1,000 employees. As before, the conclusions are similar if the estimates from either Models 3.2 or 3.3 are used in place of Model 3.1. The results also hold for Table 4 where firm size is not also included as an interaction term and in Table 5.



Firm Location: The marginal effects of establishment location in a main business is approximately 2.4 percentage points (probability of foreign technology adoption increases from 11.0% to 13.4% with central business location) based on Model 5.1 and assuming mean values for all right-hand-side variables except location. This difference is robust to the other three models presented in Table 5.

Interest Rates: The effects associated with the real interest variable can be seen by the marginal plots presented in Figure 2. Over the range of the real interest rate variable in the data set the probability of licensing foreign-owned technology is calculated and plotted as a dark black line in the figure with associated confidence interval (95% level) displayed as the area shaded in red around these point estimates. As before, the analysis uses Model 3.1 estimates and mean sample values for all other right-hand-side variables.




The results show that real interest rates are an important factor in driving foreign technology use for the set of countries we analyze. In particular, over the range of real interest rates in our data set, the marginal effects of using such technology increases from less than half of the sample

mean for the licensing variable (13.6%) at negative real rates to probabilities in the 20% region at the highest real interest rate values. The conclusions drawn are qualitatively similar if the other two models in Table 3 are used instead for the analysis. The estimates are also qualitatively similar to the parameter estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5 where the interest rate variable is included in the model.

Education: Based on the estimates presented in Model 5.1 the probability of licensing foreign technology increases from 10.6% to 14.5% with educational attainment, although as Figure 3 shows the confidence interval for the EDU variable is relatively large. Facing competition from unregistered firms results in a modest 1.7 percentage points increase in the use of foreign technology based on Model 5.2 estimates. Marginal effects for the tax obstacle variable were not estimated due to the lack of statistical significance for this variable based on the results of Model 5.4.

We now turn to the concluding section.



6. CONCLUSIONS

The current paper is – to the best of our knowledge – the first that uses a large cross-country dataset to systematically analyze the drivers of foreign technology licensing from the perspective of the licensees. The empirical analysis yielded several important and highly policy-relevant results: A first major finding shows that manufacturing firms with own R&D capabilities were more likely to license foreign technologies, implying that foreign technology licensing and own R&D are complements rather than substitutes. Taking into account that the majority of countries in our sample are developing countries, this finding has important policy implications: Complementarity of foreign technology licensing and indigenous R&D implies that governments of developing countries should foster rather than suppress foreign technology purchases in order to push the development of their countries.

A second major finding is that location is a key factor influencing a firm's propensity to purchase foreign technology. It is in particular location in the countries' main business cities that has a positive impact on firms' foreign technology purchases. As these places combine 'local buzz' with 'global pipelines' they seem to provide a particularly fertile soil for innovative firms making use of foreign technology.

The third major result is the importance of the macroeconomic and institutional environment for the attractiveness of foreign technology licensing. Not all institutional and macroeconomic variables matter, but some play an important role: Greater literacy facilitated foreign technology licensing, while overall economic prosperity of a nation did not have a significant impact. Higher domestic interest rates increase the costs of investment in own R&D and induce firms to license technology from abroad. Finally, some institutions like greater economic freedom aided technology licensing, while others like strong patent protection did not have a sizable impact.

From a policy perspective a few implications are new, while others reinforce extant wisdom. The importance of own (indigenous) R&D, not only for innovation but for fruitful collaboration with foreign partners is clearly confirmed. Governments routinely subsidize R&D and, in some cases where they are themselves operating in the public sector, they are directly involved in approaching foreign technology licensors. Secondly, the greater propensities of large firms in seeking foreign technologies might call for some leniency in antitrust action. Thirdly, the importance of good institutions is already widely recognized. Fourth, given the locational advantages of firms located in the nations' business capitals, perhaps separate policies need to be formulated to foster knowledge transfer among and to firms located away from business capitals. Fifth, the negative spillovers from informal markets to knowledge transfers likely provide lawmakers with another reason to check the growth of the underground economy. Finally, the positive influence of interest rates, when viewed in the context of monetary policy, provide another aspect to weigh when considering the pros and cons of a tight money policy.

In closing we suggest some directions for future research. First, this research is based on survey of manufacturing firms. In recent years, especially with the growth of the internet, the importance and innovation in the service sectors have increased. So it would be interesting to examine the behavior of firms seeking foreign technologies in the service (and other non-manufacturing) sector. Second, the findings of the current paper may be complemented by research that focusses at single countries, but makes use of more detailed information of other important aspects of foreign technology licensing. Considering, e.g., the nature of technology transfer contracts, the presence and degree of equity participation, the exit clauses, etc. would provide valuable additional insights.

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Table 1: Variable definitions, summary statistics and data sources

Variable	Mean (standard deviation)	Source
Establishment uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company?, (1=yes, 0=no), [<i>Licensing</i>]	0.136 (0.343)	[1]
Establishment size category measured by full-time equivalent workers, (in logs), [<i>SIZE</i>]	3.406 (1.400)	[1]
Age of the establishment (years), [<i>AGE</i>]	21.725 (15.088)	[1]
Establishment legal status is sole proprietorship, (1=yes, 0=no), [<i>SOLEprop</i>]	0.323 (0.468)	[1]
Establishment spent on R&D (excl. market research) during last fiscal year, (1=yes, 0=no), [<i>R&D</i>]	0.231 (0.421)	[1]
GDP per capita (thousands) in PPP (constant 2011 international \$), lagged one year (in logs), [<i>GDP</i>]	11.058 (7.490)	[2]
Lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator, [<i>Interest Rate</i>]	6.115 (5.162)	[2]
Economic Freedom Index, (0 – 100, higher values imply more freedom), [<i>EF</i>]	57.780 (7.118)	[3]
Index of patent protection, 2005, higher values imply stronger patent protection, [<i>PatentPROT</i>]	3.385 (0.760)	[4]
Percent of full-time workers who have completed high school, [<i>EDU</i>]	53.088 (34.897)	[1]
Establishment competes against unregistered or informal firms, (1=yes, 0=no), [<i>INFORMAL</i>]	0.190 (0.393)	[1]
Establishment located in main business city of country, (1=yes, 0=no), [<i>LOCATION</i>]	0.649 (0.478)	[1]
Tax rates are a major or very severe obstacle to operations of establishment, (1=yes, 0=no), [<i>TAX</i>]	0.296 (0.456)	[1]

Notes: Statistics pertain to observations used in the first model the variable appears.

Sources: [1]. Enterprise Surveys (<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org>), The World Bank. Data were taken for all available years between 2006 and 2016 were the survey was conducted the Enterprise Surveys Global Methodology. Accessed July, 2017. The list of countries included in the data set and survey years can be found in the Appendix.

[2]. World Development Indicators, The World Bank (accessed July, 2017).

[3]. Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, overall score. <http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year> (accessed August, 2017).

[4]. Park, W.G., 2008, International patent protection: 1960–2005, *Research Policy*, 37, 761-766.

Table 2: Correlation matrix of key variables

	Licensing	SIZE	AGE	SOLEprop	R&D	GDP	Interest Rate
<i>Licensing</i>	1.00						
Firm size [<i>SIZE</i>]	0.226	1.00					
Firm age [<i>AGE</i>]	0.047	0.274	1.00				
Legal status [<i>SOLEprop</i>]	-0.089	-0.300	-0.139	1.00			
Research and development [<i>R&D</i>]	0.141	0.252	0.125	-0.115	1.00		
Lagged GDP [<i>GDP</i>]	0.023	0.089	0.050	-0.287	-0.019	1.00	
Real interest rates [<i>Interest Rate</i>]	0.029	-0.041	-0.061	0.072	-0.042	-0.256	1.00

Note: Pairwise correlations based on maximum sample size for each pair of variables. All statistics are significant at the 1% level.

Table 3: Licensing foreign technologies: Baseline results
(Dependent variable: Licensing)

Model →	3.1	3.2	3.3
Firm size [SIZE]	0.398** (16.1)	0.410** (15.8)	0.444** (18.6)
Age of the establishment (years) [AGE]	-0.002 (1.3)	-0.003 (1.4)	-0.001 (0.5)
Legal status of firm is sole proprietorship [SOLEprop]	-0.170 (1.3)	-0.129 (0.9)	-0.032 (0.2)
Firms spent on research and development [R&D]	0.566** (4.4)	0.543** (4.2)	0.551** (5.0)
<i>Country-level control variables</i>			
Lagged GDP per capita, PPP [GDP]	0.005 (0.3)	0.004 (0.3)	0.007 (0.5)
Real Interest Rates [Interest Rate]	0.042** (2.8)	0.042** (2.6)	0.030 (1.6)
Economic Freedom [EF]		0.012 (1.5)	0.009 (0.9)
Patent protection [PatentPROT]			-0.082 (0.6)
LR χ^2	542.94**	573.85**	860.42**
Observations	43,201	42,113	35,108

Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All models are estimated via logistic regression and include a constant term. The numbers in parentheses are (absolute value) z-statistics based on country-level clustered standard errors.

* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level (or better).

Table 4: Licensing foreign technologies: R&D with interaction effects

(Dependent variable: Licensing)

Model →	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4
Firm size	0.413**	0.389**	0.420**	0.433**
[<i>SIZE</i>]	(16.6)	(17.2)	(17.9)	(15.1)
Age of the establishment	-0.004**	-0.005*	-0.003	-0.002
(years) [<i>AGE</i>]	(2.3)	(1.9)	(1.6)	(1.1)
Legal status of firm is sole	-0.151	-0.125	-0.044	-0.169
proprietorship [<i>SOLEprop</i>]	(1.3)	(1.1)	(0.2)	(1.3)
Firms spent on research and	0.937**	0.504**	0.511**	0.991**
development [<i>R&D</i>]	(8.4)	(3.1)	(6.4)	(8.3)
Interaction:	-0.096**			-0.101**
<i>R&D X SIZE</i>	(3.7)			(3.3)
Interaction:		0.000		
<i>R&D X AGE</i>		(0.1)		
Interaction:			0.019	
<i>R&D X SOLEprop</i>			(0.1)	
<i>Country-level control variables</i>				
Lagged GDP per capita, PPP	0.001	-0.002	0.006	0.000
[<i>GDP</i>]	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)
Real Interest Rates				0.042**
[<i>Interest Rate</i>]				(2.8)
Economic Freedom [<i>EF</i>]		0.013*	0.012	
		(1.7)	(1.3)	
Patent protection			-0.059	
[<i>PatentPROT</i>]			(0.4)	
LR χ^2	729.56**	698.55**	751.73**	690.51**
Observations	51,412	50,263	41,011	43,201

Notes: See Table 3.

Table 5: Licensing foreign technologies: Additional considerations
(Dependent variable: *Licensing*)

Model →	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4
Firm size	0.454**	0.387**	0.392**	0.381**
[<i>SIZE</i>]	(10.7)	(12.3)	(11.8)	(12.0)
Age of the establishment (years) [<i>AGE</i>]	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
Legal status of firm is sole proprietorship [<i>SOLEprop</i>]	0.002	-0.188	-0.179	-0.195
Firms spent on research and development [<i>R&D</i>]	0.429**	0.559**	0.563**	0.560**
Percent of workers completed high school [<i>EDU</i>]	0.004**			
	(2.6)			
Establishment competes against unregistered firms [<i>INFORMAL</i>]		0.162*		
		(1.6)		
Establishment located in main business city [<i>LOCATION</i>]	0.233**	0.222**	0.248**	0.210**
	(3.0)	(2.5)	(2.7)	(2.3)
Tax rates obstacle to business operations [<i>TAX</i>]				-0.108
				(1.5)
<i>Country-level control variables</i>				
Lagged GDP per capita, PPP [<i>GDP</i>]	0.015	0.000	0.012	0.014
	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(1.1)
Real Interest Rates [<i>Interest Rate</i>]	0.053	0.069**	0.069**	0.069**
	(1.5)	(3.9)	(3.9)	(3.9)
LR χ^2	1,432.27**	828.34**	525.74**	643.32**
Observations	18,276	32,014	35,019	32,014

Notes: See Table 3.

Appendix

Countries included in the data set

Afghanistan (2014), Albania (2013), Antigua and Barbuda (2010), Argentina (2006, 2010), Armenia (2013), Azerbaijan (2013), Bahamas (2010), Bangladesh (2013), Barbados (2010), Belarus (2013), Belize (2010), Benin (2016), Bhutan (2015), Bolivia (2006, 2010), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013), Bulgaria (2013), Burundi (2014), Cambodia (2013, 2016), Cameroon (2016), Central African Republic (2011), Chile (2006, 2010), China (2012), Colombia (2006, 2010), Costa Rica (2010), Côte d'Ivoire (2016), Croatia (2013), Czech Republic (2013), Djibouti (2013), Dominica (2010), Dominican Republic (2010, 2016), Dem. Rep. Congo (2013), Ecuador (2006, 2010), Egypt (2013), El Salvador (2006, 2010, 2016), Estonia (2013), Ethiopia (2011, 2015), Macedonia (2013), Georgia (2013), Ghana (2013), Grenada (2010), Guatemala (2006, 2010), Guinea (2016), Guyana (2010), Honduras (2006, 2010), Hungary (2013), India (2014), Indonesia (2015), Israel (2013), Jamaica (2010), Jordan (2013), Kazakhstan (2013), Kenya (2013), Kosovo (2013), Kyrgyz Republic (2013), Lao PDR (2016), Latvia (2013), Lebanon (2013), Lesotho (2016), Lithuania (2013), Malawi (2014), Malaysia (2015), Mali (2016), Mauritania (2014), Mexico (2006, 2010), Moldova (2013), Mongolia (2013), Montenegro (2013), Morocco (2013), Myanmar (2014, 2016), Namibia (2014), Nepal (2013), Nicaragua (2006, 2010), Nigeria (2014), Pakistan (2013), Panama (2006, 2010), Papua New Guinea (2015), Paraguay (2006, 2010), Peru (2006, 2010), Philippines (2015), Poland (2013), Romania (2013), Russia (2012), Rwanda (2011), Senegal (2014), Serbia (2013), Slovak Republic (2013), Slovenia (2013), Solomon Islands (2015), South Sudan (2014), Sri Lanka (2011), St. Kitts and Nevis (2010), St. Lucia (2010), St. Vincent and Grenadines (2010), Sudan (2014), Suriname (2010), Swaziland (2016), Tajikistan (2013), Tanzania (2013), Thailand (2016), Timor-Leste (2015), Togo (2016), Trinidad and Tobago (2010), Tunisia (2013), Turkey (2013), Uganda (2013), Ukraine (2013), Uruguay (2006, 2010), Uzbekistan (2013), Venezuela (2010), Vietnam (2015), West Bank and Gaza (2013), Yemen (2013), Zambia (2013), Zimbabwe (2011, 2016)

Note: N = 114 countries.